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I. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
Jurisdiction of district court and other 
courts—Right of appeal. The district court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution 
or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided l?y 
statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall 
be in all cases an appeal of right from the 
court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 5. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court is Fully Empowered to Adjudicate Hood's 
Appeal. 
Appellee, Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial") 
argues at pages 15-18 of its Brief that Appellant Hood Corporation 
("Hood") "has no business before this Court." Industrial's major 
premise, made without any citation to authority, is that Judge 
Young functioned as nothing more than an arbitrator. Its minor 
premise, also made without any citation to authority, is that in 
his capacity as an "arbitrator," Judge Young's decision is subject 
to the same deferential review accorded arbitral awards. 
Industrial's premises are flawed, and this Court should reject 
Industrial's argument for the following reasons: 
1 
1. Industrial's Suggested Rule is Unconstitutional. 
Article VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part: "Except for matters filed originally with the 
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from 
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause." (Emphasis added). Judge David S. 
Young is a judge, not an arbitrator. In that capacity, Judge Young 
entered a judgment in this case. The Constitution unambiguously 
and explicitly gives Hood "an appeal of right" from that judgment. 
Even if the Stipulation purported to waive the 
parties' constitutional right to appeal, which it does not do, the 
Stipulation does not free this Court from its constitutional duty 
to review Judge Young's judgment because stipulations between 
litigants do not bind courts "when points of law requiring judicial 
determination are involved." First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. 
C.N. Zundel and Assoc, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979); Mooney v. GR 
and Assoc. , 746 P.2d 1174, 1178 n.3 (Utah App. 1987). The one case 
other than Zundel relied on by this Court in Mooney explains why 
this Court is obligated to consider the merits of Hood's appeal 
irrespective of the parties7 Stipulation: 
A stipulation cannot be used to bind a court 
in the determination of questions of law or 
mixed questions of law and fact. On the 
contrary, it always remains the independent 
responsibility of the court to decide the law 
applicable to a particular case and the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence in regard to a 
contested claim. 
Bar 70 Enter., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1306 (Colo. 
1985)(En Banc.)(cited in Mooney, 746 P.2d at p. 1178 n.3). 
2 
2. The Parties Never Contemplated that the Stipulation 
Would Divest Hood of its Constitutional Right of Appeal, 
On January 11, 1993 Industrial filed its memorandum 
responding to Hood's motion for a hearing on Industrial's 
attorneys' fees. (R. 3438-43). In its memorandum, Industrial 
wrote: 
Given the protracted history of this cas6 and 
the litigious stance Hood has unabashedly 
adopted throughout, it is almost certain that 
Hood will appeal almost any judgment or award. 
If the court believes, in its discretion, that 
a hearing on the reasonableness of Industrial 
Indemnity's fees will minimize the prospect of 
further proceedings and thus reduce the 
accrual of additional costs and fees to any 
significant degree, Industrial Indemnity has 
no objection to such a hearing. 
(R. 3439)(emphasis added). 
On May 26, 1993, while this appeal was still pending before 
the Utah Supreme Court, Industrial filed its Motion for Summary 
Disposition Affirming Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees. In 
that motion, Industrial again said nothing about Hood's purported 
inability to appeal. Instead, at pages 9-10, Industrial wrote: 
Stripped of the unfounded and unjustifiable 
overstatements of the Docketing Statement, and 
of issues that are not raised by or even 
relevant to this case, Hood's Docketing 
Statement reveals no specific challenge to any 
of these factual findings, other than the 
ultimate conclusion or reasonableness. 
Against the highly-deferential "abuse of 
discretion" standard applicable to findings of 
fact fSprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 226 
(Utah App. 1991)), there is no significant 
issue on the unchallenged facts justifying 
more than summary appellate review of the 
trial court's exercise of its fact-finding 
powers in resolving the issue of 
reasonableness as anticipated by the governing 
Stipulation. 
3 
* * * 
In fact, the law and standards suggested by 
Hood as applicable were properly applied in 
the Court's analysis and support the judgment 
entered. 
There being no substantial or legal basis for 
Hoods' [sic] appeal, this is an appropriate 
case for summary dismissal. 
Industrial never suggested to the trial court or to the 
Supreme Court that Hood had no right of appeal. Industrial raised 
this claim for the first time in its brief to this Court. 
Industrial's argument is a last-minute and untimely rationalization 
without any legal or factual basis. 
B. The Trial Court Improperly Afforded Industrial's 
Attorneys' Fee Request a Presumption of Reasonableness. 
Hood established in its initial brief that attorneys' 
fees incurred by Industrial are not entitled to a presumption of 
reasonableness. See Appellant's Brief, pages 8-10. Industrial 
must prove the attorneys' fees claimed are reasonable. See 
Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1361 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Wilson-Jump Company 
v. McCarthy-Hundreiser and Assoc. Inc.
 P 85 111.App.3d 179, 192, 
405 N.E.2d 1322, 1325, 40 111. Dec. 230 (App. 1980); Jackson v. 
Hollowell, 685 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir 1982). Industrial 
reluctantly acknowledges this burden in its Brief;1 however, at the 
industrial states: "[i]n the end, however, Industrial did not 
press that theory [presumption of reasonableness] or argue that 
entitlement during the evidentiary hearing. In fact, Industrial's 
counsel specifically acknowledged Industrial's burden at the 
hearing, stating, 'I suppose we [Industrial] have to prove our fees 
are both reasonable and necessary.' [R. 3770]." Appellee's Brief 
at page 19. 
4 
same time, it urges this Court to adopt a presumption of 
reasonableness standard based on dated authority (Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co, v. Hittle, 96 N.W. 782 (Iowa 1903)) that has not been 
followed for several decades. See Appellee's Brief, pages 20-22. 
Industrial's erroneous argument for a presumption of 
reasonableness is based in its pleadings requesting attorneys' fees 
and costs. (R. 3166, 3397-98, 3441). According to its argument, 
Hood had the burden of proof to establish the unreasonableness of 
Industrial's attorneys' fees. 
Despite its argument, Industrial claims the trial court 
afforded it no presumption of reasonableness, and that Hood's 
argument to the contrary is "based solely on an unwarranted twist 
on a comment by Judge Young, quoted out of context . . . " See 
Appellee's Brief, page 19. Industrial suggests Judge Young's 
statement — "[s]o if it [attorneys' fees] begins out as all being 
reasonable then the prong that I think that Mr. Anderson is 
claiming the right to prevail on is that it, in fact, wasn't 
necessary" — merely reflects his understanding of the testimony of 
Hood's expert. See Appellee's Brief, pages 19-20, (R.3782). 
Industrial's claim is not supported by the record. A close review 
of the record reveals Judge Young's basic misunderstanding of 
Industrial's burden in establishing the reasonableness of its 
attorneys' fees. 
Counsel for Industrial stated at the hearing: "With 
respect to the presumption of reasonableness issue, I only think 
the law in this area is very much in dispute." (R. 3781). Counsel 
5 
then proceeded to cite authority in support of a presumption of 
reasonableness stating M . . . it's not a qu stion of looking back 
with hindsight and saying what would have been the best thing to do 
looking back. They're [Hood] not entitled t come here like Monday 
morning quarterbacks and say, well, you kn /, this wasn't really 
necessary." (R. 3781-82). These statement uggest a presumption 
of reasonableness, and contradict Industrial's begrudging 
acknowledgement of its burden of proof at tha evidentiary hearing. 
At the same hearing, Hood's expert;, Craig Mariger Esq., 
testified that Industrial's attorneys' fees were reasonable during 
certain periods of the litigation and were unreasonable during 
other periods based on the factual circumstances of each period. 
(R. 3753-3757). Mr. Mariger did not testify that all attorneys' 
fees incurred by Industrial begin as being reasonable. Indeed, 
Hood has argued from the beginning that Industrial must establish 
both the reasonableness and necessity of its attorneys' fees. 
The trial court's statement that all attorneys' fees 
"begin" as reasonable reflects a misunderstanding of Mr. Mariger's 
testimony and authority cited by Hood on this issue. The trial 
court erred, as a matter of law, by affording a presumption of 
reasonableness to the attorneys' fees incurred by Industrial. 
Co The Trial Court Failed To Make Findings of Fact on All 
Elements Required Under Existing Law. 
Industrial is required to prove the reasonableness of its 
attorneys' fee request to prevent financial abuse of its 
indemnitor, Hood, under the indemnity agreement. See Jackson v. 
Hollowell. 685 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir. 1982). In recognition of 
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the ever-present possibility of unnecessary, duplicative and 
redundant representation, courts have developed a specific test to 
determine if attorneys' fees incurred by an indemnitee satisfy the 
reasonableness and necessary standards. See Perkins v. Thompson, 
551 So.2d 204, 209 (Miss. 1989); Central Towers Apartments, Inc. v. 
Martin, 61 Tenn. App. 244, 267, 453 S.W.2d 789, 799 (App. 1969). 
Industrial claims at pages 21-22 of its Brief that the trial 
court's award of attorneys' fees survives the test set forth in 
Central Towers. This claim is, however, not supported because of 
the trial court's failure to make findings on several key factors. 
Hood established in its initial brief that the trial 
court entered no findings of fact on the following key factors of 
the Central Towers analysis: nos. 8 (the cgmpetency of Hood and 
James' attorneys); 10 (whether there was a conflict of interest 
between Industrial and Hood); 11 (the attitude and cooperativeness 
of Industrial) ; and 12 (the diligence q>f the attorneys for 
Industrial). Furthermore, the trial court failed to consider (1) 
the efficiency of Industrial's attorneys and (2) the results 
obtained by Industrial's attorneys as required under existing Utah 
law to determine the reasonableness of a request for attorneys' 
fees. See Appellant's Brief, pages 12-17; (pabrera v. Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
Industrial does not address the trial court's failure to 
make findings of fact on these key factors. Because the findings 
are deficient under (1) Utah law; and (2) the standard set forth in 
Central Towers, this Court should reverse the award of attorneys' 
7 
fees to Industrial. See Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 
P.2d 163, 174 (Utah App. 1990)(attorneys7 fee award reversed 
because the trial court's findings did not demonstrate 
consideration of "the factors established by appellate courts as 
relevant to a reduction in fees.")(emphasis added). See also. 
Matter of Estate of Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282f 286 (Utah App. 1992) ("the 
absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of 
the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and 
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.") 
D. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that 
Industrial Acted Reasonably in Maintaining a Separate Defense 
(Finding of Fact No. 14). 
Industrial argues that the evidence marshalled by Hood is 
sufficient under an abuse of discretion standard to support the 
trial court's findings that (1) Industrial's reasonably retained 
separate counsel; and (2) all of its attorneys' fees were 
reasonable. See Appellee's Brief, pages 22-24. Hood has always 
acknowledged Industrial reasonably incurred certain attorneys' 
fees. On appeal, Hood argues only that the evidence relied upon by 
the trial court and presented by Industrial in its Brief fails to 
support (1) Industrial's maintenance of a separate defense 
throughout the litigation; and (2) the trial court's award of all 
attorneys' fees claimed by Industrial. The trial court itself 
admitted its award was "somewhat arbitrary." (R. 3800, Add. 74). 
In its initial brief, Hood identified certain factors in 
the Central Towers decision critical to determining whether 
sufficient evidence exists to support an award of attorneys' fees 
8 
to a surety pursuant to an indemnity agreement.2 See Appellant's 
Brief, pages 19-24; Central Towers, 453 S.W.2d at p. 800. These 
factors led to the reversal of an award of attorneys' fees for a 
surety in Central Towers. They are present in this case, but are 
ignored by the trial court and Industrial in its Brief. Instead, 
Industrial relies on five arguments to justify the trial court's 
finding of fact no. 14. 
Industrial first argues that James' insolvency had a 
potential, detrimental impact on Industrial that justifies the 
trial court's finding. See Appellee's Brief, pages 24-25. 
Industrial's argument is not valid because (1) Hood, as 
Industrial's guarantor, was financially able to indemnify 
Industrial throughout the litigation; and (2) by executing the 
Stipulation, Industrial consciously and willingly accepted Hood's 
guarantee as Industrial's sole security. See Appellant's Brief, 
Ex. D-15, Add. 75, Add. 24-25. Industrial cannot argue in good 
faith that a separate defense was necessary based on its subjective 
feelings of insecurity after the date of the Stipulation. 
Industrial's second argument is that the defense provided 
by James was "never fully co-extensive with Industrial's 
independent defenses". See Appellee's Brief, pages 25-27. 
Industrial's argument is incorrect. Industrial filed its pleading 
2These factors are: (1) the absence of risk to the surety as 
a practical matter; (2) the solvency of the indemnitor (Hood); (3) 
the competency of the indemnitor's attorneys who were engaged to 
represent the surety's interest; (4) the active defense of the suit 
by the indemnitor's attorneys; and (5) the lack of conflict of 
interest between the indemnitor and the surety. 
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asserting its independent defenses on September 27, 1987, which 
defenses were dismissed by the trial court on May 17, 1988 (R. 968-
70) . After the dismissal, Industrial's defense was completely co-
extensive with the defense of James.3 Consequently, Industrial's 
claim of independent defenses does not support or justify its 
retention of separate counsel throughout the litigation or the 
trial court's award of post-Stipulation attorneys' fees. 
Third, Industrial argues that Hood's inactivity and 
apparent lack of interest in the litigation support the trial 
court's finding of fact no. 14. See Appellee's Brief, pages 27-28. 
Whether Hood demonstrated adequate interest in the litigation is 
immaterial. Instead, the key is whether Industrial's exposure to 
risk justified its maintenance of a separate defense. Industrial 
was never exposed to any risk in the litigation. Hood, as 
Industrial's guarantor, maintained at least a $20 million net worth 
throughout the litigation, which was made known to Industrial and 
was sufficient to satisfy any judgment on Industrial's $1,128 
million bond. See Appellant's Brief, pages 19-20, Ex. D-15, Add. 
75. 
Even if Hood's level of interest is properly at issue, 
Hood, James and its liability insurers expended approximately 
$626,000 in attorneys' fees and expert fees in defense of the 
30n February 5, 1991 Industrial did ask the trial court to 
permit Industrial to raise an "overpayment defense" allegedly not 
available to James. (R. 1093-1107). The trial court denied that 
request on March 20, 1991 (R. 1458-59). 
10 
litigation. (R. 3294). The amount expended by Hood is hardly the 
act of an inactive or disinterested party. 
In its fourth argument, Industrial states that Hood's 
refusal to post collateral supports the trial court's finding of 
fact no. 14. See Appellee's Brief, pages 28-29. Industrial did 
not request collateral from Hood unt^l August 1987. (R. 3599-
3602). Following months of negotiations, Hood and Industrial 
executed the Stipulation in April, 1988. (R. 902-09, Appellant's 
Brief Add. 20-27). The Stipulation unequivocally states that 
Industrial agreed to look only to Hood's net worth for security and 
relieved Hood of any obligation to post collateral. These 
undisputed facts establish only an eight-month window during which 
Industrial can plead insecurity, and even that claim is rendered 
void by the subsequent Stipulation with no separate security. 
Despite these facts, the trial court determined 
Industrial acted reasonably in maintaining a separate defense and 
awarded Industrial all of its attorneys' fees. In its oral ruling, 
the trial court relied exclusively on Industrial's perceived 
insecurity as the sole basis for finding Industrial's attorneys' 
fees reasonable. See Hood's initial brief at pp. 22-24. The trial 
court abused its discretion since the posting of collateral was a 
non-issue for all but eight months of the litigation. 
In its fifth and final argument, Industrial states that 
its separate defense and attorneys' fees were reasonable because 
Hood did not demand Industrial re-tender its defense until late in 
the litigation. See Appellee's Brief, pages 29-31. This argument 
11 
is misleading. Reed Brown, counsel for James, requested Industrial 
re-tender its defense on August 25, 1987. (R. 3188). Industrial 
refused to do so and instead demanded that Hood post collateral. 
In response to Industrial's demand, Hood and Industrial executed 
the Stipulation, which resolved the collateral issue. Industrial 
nevertheless stubbornly continued its separate defense. (R. 906-
07, 3666, Appellant's Brief Add. 24-25, 50); Appellee's Brief, 
pages 8-9. Industrial incurred approximately $71,500.00 in 
attorneys' fees between Mr. Brown's August 25, 1987 request for re-
tender, and August 2, 1991, the date Industrial re-tendered its 
defense to Hood. (Ex. P-l). Industrial's incurrence of these 
fees was unreasonable especially in light of (1) Mr. Brown's 
request for re-tender, and (2) the execution of the Stipulation. 
At page 13 of its brief, Industrial asserts: 
with the exception of the period between 
James' rejection of Industrial's tender and 
the Stipulation reached with Hood, 
Industrial's counsel was involved only in 
monitoring the case, responding to discovery 
requests from plaintiff, participating in 
settlement discussion or filing motions and 
otherwise rendering assistance or expertise 
requested by James or Hood relating to 
Industrial's independent surety defenses and 
in support of general defense strategy. 
Industrial's assertion is incorrect. Prior to June 25, 1987, (the 
date James rejected Industrial's tender), Industrial incurred 
attorneys' fees for attendance at depositions, trial preparation 
and other matters not mentioned by Industrial in the above 
synopsis. See Ex. P-l. The attorneys' fees Industrial incurred 
during this period totalled approximately $21,825.87, the majority 
12 
of which were incurred through excessive and unreasonable fees for 
"monitoring the case". 
After the Stipulation, Industrial continued to incur 
additional attorneys7 fees of approximately $88,000 (Ex. P-l). 
Yetf its own billing records belie Industrial's characterization of 
those fees. Even after the Stipulation, Industrial continued to 
attend depositions and perform other work not indicated above. 
Industrial's arguments do not support the trial court's 
finding that Industrial acted reasonably in maintaining a separate 
defense throughout the Litigation. Hood has never contended 
Industrial should receive none of its attorneys' fees. The trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to exercise any discretion 
in evaluating Industrial's request. For these reasons, the trial 
court's entry of finding of fact no. 14 was an abuse of discretion 
and must be reversed.4 
E. The Trial Court's Aw^rd of Attorneys' Pees for 
Duplicative and Redundant Legal Services Was Improper as a Matter 
of Law 
Industrial argues that the trial court made no finding of 
fact or conclusion or law that Industrial incurred duplicative or 
unnecessary legal services. See Appellee's Brief, page 35. 
Because Hood claims the trial court committed an error of law in 
awarding Industrial fees for duplicative work, See Appellant's 
industrial does not directly confront Hood's arguments 
concerning the trial court's abuse of discretion in its Finding No. 
25. Rather than repeating that argument here, Hood directs the 
Court's attention to pages 25-30 of its initial brief. 
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Brief, pages 30-36, the presence of absence of findings or 
conclusions is legally irrelevant.5 
Hood identified various occurrences of duplicative or 
redundant representation by Industrial's counsel for which the 
trial court approved the recovery of attorneys' fees. See id. 
Industrial does not challenge or distinguish the legal authorities 
cited by Hood establishing the inability of an indemnitee to 
recover attorneys' fees for duplicative or redundant legal 
services. As a matter of law, Industrial's recovery of attorneys' 
fees must be limited to those reasonably and necessarily incurred 
and not for duplicative or redundant representation. 
Of particular concern are the 11 depositions attended by 
counsel for James and by Industrial's separate counsel. The 
undisputed authority cited by Hood establishes that a surety cannot 
recover attorneys' fees incurred for attending depositions if such 
fees pay for duplicative services simultaneously being rendered by 
the principal's counsel. See Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & 
Dock Co., 60 Ohio App.2d 248, 396 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (App. 1978). 
In addition, 5 of the 11 depositions occurred after the April 4, 
1988 stipulation date Industrial identifies at page 8 of its 
Appellee's Brief. (R. 3366-81). Under the Stipulation, Industrial 
relied solely on Hood's financial strength as its guarantor in the 
litigation. (R. 906-07, Appellant's Brief Add. 24-25). Industrial 
5This is not an issue of fact as suggested by Industrial; 
rather, it is an issue of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. 
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had no risk and, therefore, no reasonable basis for attending those 
depositions. 
Industrial cannot recover attorneys' fees expended for 
its counsel's unproductive attendance at depositions relating to 
Hood's and James' defenses or for other duplicative or redundant 
legal services.6 
P. The Trial Court's Award of Prejudgment Interest was 
Improper. 
Hood established in its initial brief that the abuse of 
discretion standard used to review an award of reasonable 
attorneys' fees is incompatible with an award of prejudgment 
interest. Industrial does not in any way address or challenge this 
incompatibility. Instead, Industrial argues that indemnity 
agreements are in some way different, making them an exception to 
controlling legal principles. To the contrary, indemnity 
agreements are not exceptions to the legal rules set forth in 
Hood's initial brief. 
In Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1360-
61 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), two 
6At page 34 of its Brief, Industrial confuses Mr. Mariger's 
testimony concerning the reasonableness of attorneys' fees incurred 
as a result of a request for assistance. Judge Young asked Mr. 
Mariger if counsel for James requested Industrial's assistance, are 
Industrial's attorneys' fees incurred in response to such a request 
reasonable? Mr. Mariger responded that he "would have a hard time 
saying it was unreasonable . . ."Mr. Mariger further said, 
however, he could not believe Mr. Brown requested Industrial's 
assistance at the very time he requested Industrial to re-tender 
its defense. (R.3776-7). Mr. Mariger testified that Industrial's 
refusal to re-tender and subsequent negotiations to reduce 
Industrial's involvement through the Stipulation evidence Mr. 
Brown's attempt to remove Industrial from the defense of the 
Litigation. Id. 
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defendants appealed the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees 
pursuant to an indemnity agreement. That agreement provided 
indemnity "'from any and all claims and loss . . . including 
attorneys' fees . . . arising from claims' made by" the plaintiff. 
Id. at 1360. The indemnitees argued evidence of reasonableness was 
unnecessary because the fee request was made pursuant to an 
indemnity agreement. The trial court, however, denied the fee 
request because there was no evidence to support it. 
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held: "We 
see no basis for distinguishing a request for attorney fees under 
an indemnity provision from a request under an attorney fee 
provision." Id. at 1361 (emphasis added). In addition, 
authorities cited by Hood in its initial brief specifically deny 
prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees arising in an indemnity 
context. 
In United States v. Hardage. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993), 
the trial court found a hazardous waste transporter/indemnitor 
liable for attorneys' fees incurred by a hazardous waste 
generator/indemnitee pursuant to various indemnification 
provisions. See Id. at pp. 1432-36. The trial court awarded the 
hazardous waste generator/indemnitee all requested attorneys' fees. 
The appellate court reversed and remanded that award for a 
determination of the reasonableness of those attorneys' fees. See 
Id. at 1436-37. 
The trial court also awarded—as did the trial court in this 
action—prejudgment interest on all attorneys fees from the time of 
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each payment. It did so pursuant to Oklahoma law functionally 
identical to the rule in Utah.7 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial courts prejudgment 
interest award, holding: 
An award of attorneys' fees is not a sum 
certain where the reasonableness of those fees 
is still to be determined by the trial court. 
. . Because we hold that the district court 
must determine the reasonableness of the legal 
expenses underlying the [attorneys' fees] 
assessments, the district court's award of 
prejudgment interest is reversed. 
Id. at p. 1438. 
In Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Drake, 27 Wash.App. 2d 529, 618 
P.2d 1341 (App. 1980) the employee of a construction subcontractor 
was injured. The employee sued the general contractor for damages 
and the general contractor tendered the defense to the 
subcontractor/employer pursuant to an indemnity agreement. The 
subcontractor/employer refused to defend the lawsuit as required by 
its indemnity agreement, and the general contractor/indemnitee was 
required to hire its own attorneys at an expense of $76,797.90 as 
set by the jury. See id. at p. 1345. The general 
contractor/indemnitee was successful in its defense of the 
employee's action. See id. at p. 1342. 
After the employee's suit was concluded, the subcontractor 
sued the contractor to recover money the subcontractor contended it 
70kla.Stat.Ann. tit. 23 § 6 (West 1987) provides: "any person 
who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being 
made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is 
vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover 
interest thereon from that day, . . ." Id. at p. 1438. 
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spent to replace and repair towers damaged in the employee's 
accident. See id. The contractor counterclaimed to recover, 
pursuant to the indemnification agreement, expenses it incurred in 
its defense of the employee's suit. The trial court dismissed the 
subcontractor's complaint, and granted the contractor's indemnity 
claim against the subcontractor. See id. 
However, the trial court denied prejudgment interest on the 
award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the indemnity agreement. See 
id. at p. 1345. In affirming the trial court's denial of 
prejudgment interest, the Washington Court of Appeals held: 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded 
(1) when an amount claimed is liquidated, 
or (2) when the amount claimed is 
unliquidated and this amount is 
determinable by computation with reference 
to a fixed standard contained in the 
contract. 
A claim is unliquidated if the principal must 
be arrived at by a determination of 
reasonableness. 
The question of reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees expended by Drake was 
determined by the jury. Until that was 
resolved by the jury, the claim was 
unliquidated. . . therefore prejudgment 
interest on attorneys' fees was properly 
denied by the trial court. 
Id. at p. 1346 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, Industrial is wrong in its unsupported assertion 
that prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees is somehow treated 
differently in an indemnity context. 
Similarly, Industrial is wrong in its argument, at page 39 of 
its brief, that its attorneys' fee payments were liquidated. 
Numerous authorities establish that the amount of reasonable 
attorneys' fees is unliquidated until the trier of fact makes a 
determination of reasonableness. See, e.g., Tri-M. 618 P.2d at p. 
1346; ALI v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 5 Ohio App.3d 105, 449 N.E.2d 
495, 499 (App. 1982); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 
487 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1973). 
Furthermore, Industrial is once again wrong when it asserts, 
at page 39 of its brief, that the trial court employed "no 
guesswork or estimation in the total of the fees incurred. . ." As 
Hood set forth at page 29 of its initial brief, the trial court 
exhibited guesswork in the extreme in its award of Industrial's 
reasonable attorneys fees: "I either take [$]51,000.00 or I take 
[$]122,000.00 if I buy the argument that they [Industrial] aren,t 
entitled to any interest and I minus from that $5,000.00 plus or 
minus for the errors in it, or I take $171,000.00. Now every one 
of them strikes me as being somewhat arbitrary. Any one of the 
three." (R. 3800)(emphasis added). Whether viewed from a purely 
legal standpoint, or from the trial court's own perception that any 
particular award of attorneys' fees in this case would be "somewhat 
arbitrary," Industrial's attorneys' fees were not liquidated. 
Finally, at page 40 of its brief, Industrial invites the Court 
to picture a parade of horribles whereby any indemnitor could avoid 
interest merely by challenging the "reasonableness" of attorneys' 
fees. Industrial drafted the Stipulation, which provided Hood 
would be liable only for Industrial's "reasonable" attorneys' fees. 
If sureties/indemnitees such as Industrial want to avoid a 
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challenge to the reasonability of the attorneys' fees they elect to 
incur, they may include a provision in indemnity agreements 
providing that an indemnitor will pay all of the surety's 
attorneys' fees incurred, without regard to reasonableness. 
Sureties similarly could insert a provision whereby the indemnitor 
specifically agrees that all attorneys' fees incurred by a surety 
are conclusively established as a liability of the indemnitor. 
Sureties may insert a provision requiring indemnitors to pay some 
fixed amount, liquidated in advance. Under any of these 
provisions, Utah law would authorize an award of prejudgment 
interest. Industrial did not, however, utilize a provision 
liquidating the attorneys' fees it chose to incur. 
Industrial relies on only two cases in fashioning its argument 
regarding prejudgment interest. Those cases have no application to 
this appeal. Both Worthington & Kimball v. C & A Dev. Co. , 777 
P.2d 475 (Utah 1989) and Morrison-Knudsen Co. , Inc. v. The 
Makahuena Corp.. 66 Haw. 663, 675 P.2d 760 (1983) have nothing to 
do with either attorneys' fees or prejudgment interest. Both of 
these cases involved arbitrations, and the unique set of rules 
applicable in the arbitration context. As noted by the Worthington 
Court, American Arbitration Association Rule 43 provides that 
11
'[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which is just and 
equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the parties.'" 
Worthington. 777 P.2d at p. 478. The Worthington Court held only 
that this rule, along with language in the contract between the 
parties providing that "unpaid sums due thereunder shall bear 
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interest at the rate paid on the construction loan or at the legal 
rate, whichever is greater/' justified the arbitrator's award of 
15% interest for reimbursement of out-of-pocket interest payments. 
Similarly, Makahuena involved a challenge only to the amount of 
post-judgment interest. Neither of these cases has any relevance 
to this appeal. 
(j. Industrial is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Pees (in Appeal 
In its separate February 17, 1994 Motion and Memorandum 
for Award of Attorneys Fees on Appeal and Remand to Trial Court to 
Assess Amount, Industrial asks this Court to award Industrial its 
attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. Numerous authorities establish 
that this Court should deny Industrial its attorneys' fees on 
appeal, even if it should prevail. 
The Washington Supreme Court stated the rule that defeats 
Industrial's request: 
We have not heretofore had occasion to 
consider whether attorneys' fees attributable 
solely to litigation of the indemnity issue 
itself are recoverable. The general, and 
virtually unanimous rule appears to limit the 
allowance of such fees to the defense of the 
claim indemnified against and not to extend 
such allowance for services rendered in 
establishing the right to indemnification. 41 
Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 36 (Supp.1974); 42 
C.J.S. Indemnity § 13d (1944). We hold, 
therefore, that, in the absence of express 
contractual terms to the contrary, an 
indemnitee may not recover legal fees incurred 
in establishing his right to indemnification. 
Jones v. Strom Construction Co., 84 Wash.2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115, 
1119 (1974)(emphasis added). See also. Amazi v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co.f 249 Mont. 355, 816 P.2d 431, 434-35 (1991)(the majority rule 
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is that a party is not entitled to its fees and costs incurred in 
establishing its right to indemnity); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. The 
Barge W-701. 654 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981) cert, denied. 455 
U.S. 944 (1982)(joining with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
of the United States Court of Appeals in holding that, under a 
general indemnity agreement, an indemnitee enjoys no right to 
recover its legal fees incurred in establishing its right to 
indemnification); Ranger Const. Co. v. Prince William Cnty. School 
Bd., 605 F.2d 1298, 1304-05 (4th Cir. 1979); Simko v. C & C Marine 
Maint. Co. , 594 F.2d 960, 968-69 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 
833 (1989)(both to the same effect). 
Yet another United States Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Second, has explained the reason for this rule: 
Indemnity obligations, whether imposed by 
contract or by law, require the indemnitor to 
hold the indemnitee harmless from costs in 
connection with a particular class of claims. 
Legal fees and expenses incurred in defending 
an indemnified claim are one such cost and 
thus fall squarely within the obligation to 
indemnify. . . . Such reasoning does not apply 
to fees and expenses incurred in establishing 
the existence of an obligation to indemnify, 
since such expenses are not by their nature a 
part of the claim indemnified against. 
Rather, they are costs incurred in suing for a 
breach of contract, to wit, the failure to 
indemnify. As such, fees and expenses 
incurred in establishing the indemnity 
obligation fall within the ordinary rule 
requiring a party to bear his own expenses of 
litigation, see Berger, Court Awarded 
Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable11?. 126 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 281 (1977). Cf. 5 Corbin, 
Contracts § 1037 (1964)(attorneys' fees and 
expenses may be covered if they constitute 
damages from the breach of a contract but not 
if they are incurred in proving the breach.) 
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Of course, when, as here, the obligation to 
indemnify arises out of a contract, the rule 
that an indemnitee cannot recover the costs of 
establishing the right to indemnification does 
not apply if "the agreement explicitly states 
otherwise." However, while the indemnity 
clause of Massport's contract with Italian 
Line, quoted above, contains the phrase, 
"including but not limited to cost of suit and 
attorneys7 fees," these words are more 
naturally construed as referring to legal 
expenses incurred in defending against the 
primary claim. Merely including the words 
"attorneys' fees" among the expenses 
indemnified against in the main action cannot 
reasonably be viewed as causing a shifting of 
fees in an action to establish the obligation 
to indemnify. 
Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. "Hermes", 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2nd Cir. 
1985). 
In Amazi v. Atlantic Richfield Co., an indemnitee sought 
indemnity totalling $70,250.75. Of this sum, $50,449.51 was 
expended in defending the case. The remaining $19,801.24 was spent 
in trying to secure indemnity. The trial court awarded the amounts 
incurred in defending the case, and disallowed all sums the 
indemnitee incurred in securing indemnity. 
The indemnitee claimed its entitlement to attorneys' fees 
incurred in attempting to secure indemnity arose from the following 
indemnity provision: 
If indemnity is required by any of the terms 
of this Agreement, the responsible party shall 
defend the other and pay all settlements, 
judgments, costs, including reasonable 
attorneys fees, and other related expenses 
similar or dissimilar to the foregoing. 
Id. at p. 435. 
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On appeal the indemnitee argued that such "related 
expenses" include attorneys' fees incurred in establishing its 
contractual right to indemnification. In doing so, the indemnitee 
cited the rule that contracts for indemnification are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the party intended to be 
indemnified. See id. 
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, and affirming the 
trial court, the Montana Supreme Court held: 
While contracts of indemnity are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the 
indemnitee, the provision here is not in and 
of itself such a contract. Rather it is a 
contract term allowing for recovery of certain 
attorneys' fees. Under the majority rule just 
adopted, such a term must be express in order 
for an indemnitee to recover legal fees 
incurred in establishing its right to 
indemnification. We conclude that the 
provision here is not sufficiently express, 
and affirm the District Court's adoption of 
the majority rule regarding such fees. 
Id (emphasis provided by the Amazi court). 
In addressing the issue in the context of appeals, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals indicated why Industrial's request cannot 
succeed: 
[Indemnitee] has asked for its attorney's fees 
on appeal because the matter arises from 
contract. Under general indemnity principles, 
[indemnitee] would have no right to fees: the 
right of indemnity includes a right to 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
underlying claim, but does not include the 
right to fees incurred in establishing the 
right of indemnity. 
INA Ins. Co. of N. America v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 248, 
722 P.2d 975, 983 (App. 1986). Similarly, Industrial cannot 
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prevail on its request for attorneys' fees on appeal because it can 
point to no sufficiently express contractual provision permitting 




For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's judgment, and disallow Industrial's requested attorneys' 
fees on appeal. 
DATED this \(p day of March, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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